Nevada Supreme Court Weighs in on Public Records Issues - The Writ
On March 29, 2018, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an important decision that affects public entities and those who seek to follow how public officials conduct government business. In Comstock Residents Ass’n v. Lyon Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 19 (2018), the Court held that communications by public officials on private cell phones or through private email are not categorically exempt from the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA). To reach this conclusion, the Court interpreted the statutory language in the context of modern-day communication norms that likely were not contemplated at the time of the NPRA’s enactment.
Comstock Residents Association (CRA) sued Lyon County over its approval of a zoning change for an industrial development. As part of its suit, CRA made a public records request of the County and its commissioners seeking communications regarding the zoning change approval, whether the communications were on public or private devices. The county’s website listed the commissioners’ personal phone numbers and email addresses as their contact information and conceded that the commissioners used their private phones and emails to conduct public business. Nevertheless, in response to CRA’s request, the county informed CRA that it would not produce the requested communications because it did not provide or pay for phones or email accounts for any commissioners.
CRA petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus to compel the county to disclose responsive public records, regardless of whether they were created or maintained on private devices. The district court denied the writ petition on the basis that the records were not open to public inspection, within the county’s control, records of official county actions or paid for with public money. CRA appealed. Interpreting the statutory language and its previous decision in Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t v. Blackjack Bonding, Inc., 131 Nev. 80, 86, 343 P.3d 608, 613 (2015) the Supreme Court rejected the district court’s reasoning, reversed and remanded.
Records on Private Devices and Email Servers Are Open to Public Inspection
The county contended that the communications sought by CRA could not be deemed public records because they were not maintained in public offices or open to public inspection during office hours within the meaning of NRS 239.010(1). The Court disagreed. Acknowledging that the statutory language was not clear, the Court looked at other statutory provisions. Specifically, the Court noted language in NRS 239.001(4), which states: “The use of private entities in the provision of public services must not deprive members of the public access to inspect and copy books and records relating to the provision of those services.” Moreover, given that a governmental entity has five days to resolve a public records request, the Court concluded that “NRS 239.010(1) cannot be read as limiting public records to those that are physically maintained at a government location or on a government server and are immediately accessible to the public during the business hours of that governmental entity.” To do so, the Court opined, would render other statutory provisions meaningless.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited two precedents: In Blackjack, the Court compelled the production of public records that were in the possession of private parties. In Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Gibbons, 127 Nev. 873, 876, 885-86, 266 P.3d 623, 625, 631 (2011), the Court required the governor to state specific reasons for withholding from disclosure emails that were sent from a state-issued email account. Pointing to this jurisprudence and the Legislature’s requirement to construe the NPRA liberally in favor of access, the Court concluded that the “only logical interpretation” of the statute regarding public inspection “does not limit what qualifies as a public record.”
As a result, the Court explained, the “proper question” for differentiating public from private records is “whether they concern ‘the provision of a public service,’” as defined in Blackjack. In that the county conceded that the commissioners conducted public business on their personal devices and email accounts, the NPRA’s emphasis on government transparency warranted the conclusion that their communications constituted “the provision of public service.” The Court pointed to numerous other jurisdictions that agree.
Records That Can be Generated or Obtained by the Commissioners are Within the County’s Control
The county also contended that the sought-after communications were not within its legal custody, as that term is defined by NAC 239.041. The Court rejected that argument, noting that the administrative regulation in question only addresses best practices for local governments’ records management programs created under NRS 239.125(1). The Court was careful not to “conflate” the regulation with what constitutes a public record under the NPRA. The commissioners’ legal custody of their own phones and emails was sufficient to make the records subject to disclosure.
Remedy
Importantly, the Supreme Court did not order that the requested documents be produced. Rather, it concluded only that the records maintained on private devices and servers are not categorically excluded from the NPRA’s scope. The Court remanded to the district court to: (1) determine whether the requested records were made in “the provision of public service” and within “the control of the county or its commissioners” and (2) consider any challenges to disclosure of any particular record on the basis of privacy or a statutory exemption.